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Abstract
When compared to signature-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), anomaly
detectors present the potential advantage of detecting previously unseen attacks,
which makes them an attractive solution against zero-day exploits and other
attacks for which a signature is unavailable. Most anomaly detectors rely on
machine learning algorithms to derive a model of normality that is later used
to detect suspicious events. Such algorithms, however, are generally susceptible
to evasion by means of carefully constructed attacks that are not recognized
as anomalous. Different strategies to thwart evasion have been proposed over
the last years, including the use of randomization to make somewhat uncertain
how each packet will be processed. In this paper we analyze the strength of the
randomization strategy suggested for Anagram, a well-known anomaly detector
based on n-gram models. We show that an adversary who can interact with
the system for a short period of time with inputs of his choosing will be able
to recover the secret mask used to process packets. We describe and discuss
an efficient algorithm to do this and report our experiences with a prototype
implementation. Furthermore, we show that the specific form of randomization
suggested for Anagram is a double-edged sword, as knowledge of the mask
makes evasion easier than in the non-randomized case. We finally discuss a
simple countermeasure to prevent our attacks.
Keywords: Intrusion detection systems, anomaly detection, evasion attacks,
adversarial classification
1. Introduction
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) constitute a primary compo-
nent for securing computing infrastructures. A NIDS scans network traffic and
seeks to identify evidence of ongoing attacks, intrusion attempts or violations
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of the security policies [1]. Since they are key elements of most organizations’
cyberdefense systems, NIDS often become themselves targets of attacks aimed
at undermining their detection capabilities. A recent survey on this topic by
Corona et al. [2] identifies six general categories of attacks against them: (a)
Evasion, where an attack payload is carefully modified so that the NIDS would
not be able to detect it; (b) Overstimulation, where the NIDS is fed with a
large number of attack patterns to overwhelm analysts and security opera-
tors; (c) Poisoning, where misleading patterns are injected in the data used
to train/construct the detection function; (d) Denial-of-Service, where the de-
tection function is disabled or severely damaged; (e) Response Hijacking, where
carefully constructed patterns produce incorrect alerts so as to induce a desired
response; and (f) Reverse Engineering, where an adversary gathers information
about the internals of the NIDS by stimulating it with chosen input patterns
and observing the response.
Reverse engineering attacks often seek to acquire knowledge that is essential
to subsequently attain other attack goals. One clear example is evasion, as the
attacker generally does not possess full details about the detection function and,
therefore, potential ways of evading it. For example, in anomaly-based NIDS
the detection function is commonly built from a set of “normal” (and attack-
free) events, such as network traffic or service requests, using machine learning
algorithms [3, 4, 5, 6]. The resulting model is then used to spot anomalous
activities, assuming that anything deviating from normality is suspicious. A
direct consequence of this operation principle is that any network packet that
fits the normality model will not raise any alarm. An advanced attacker could
try to modify his original attack payload so that it blends in with the normal
behavior of a network, thus evading detection. These strategies were termed
Polymorphic Blending Attacks (PBA) by Fogla et al. in [7], and were also
demonstrated by Kolesnikov et al. [8] to evade PAYL [9], an anomaly detector
based on n-grams (with n = 1 or n = 2) of the payload bytes for every observed
packet length.
The threat posed by evasion attacks has forced some schemes to incorporate
defenses to thwart them. Nearly all schemes proposed so far rely on the idea
of depriving the adversary of some critical knowledge about how the payload
will be processed. This can be achieved in a number of ways. For example,
McPAD [10] generates various different models of normality, each one based on
a distinct set of features, and uses all (or some) of them to seek anomalies. In
doing so, it forces the adversary to craft a payload that looks normal to all
models. A similar idea was explored by Biggio et al. in [11] by using multiple
classifiers and randomly assigning weights to each of them in the final decision.
Other detectors such as KIDS [12] draw some inspiration from cryptography
and propose a scheme where the normality model depends upon some secret
material (the key). In KIDS the key determines how the classification features
are extracted from the payload. The security argument here is simple: even
though the learning and detection algorithms are public, an adversary who is
not in possession of the key will not know exactly how a request will be processed
and, consequently, will not be able to design attacks that thwart detection.
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While most such schemes successfully provide a rationale of their strength
against evasion, almost none of them include in their security analysis arguments
about an adversary who first reverse engineers the detection function and then
uses the acquired knowledge to evade detection. Thus, for example, in PAYL
an adversary can try to infer, either completely or approximately, which specific
n-grams are not recognized as anomalous and then modify the attack (e.g., by
adding carefully constructed padding as in [8]) so that it matches one of those
n-grams. One debatable issue about reverse engineering attacks is precisely
their viability and/or practical relevance. To begin with, it is assumed that the
attacker can somehow observe the responses induced by inputs of his choosing,
and also that he can query the NIDS with a potentially large number of payloads.
Shedding doubts about the feasibility of doing this is reasonable, but from a
security perspective it would be unsafe to assume that it is not possible, even
if it seems hard to figure out realistic scenarios where the attacker has such a
capability at his disposal.
1.1. Contributions and organization
In this work we focus on Anagram [13], a well-known anomaly detector that
models n-grams (with n > 1) observed in normal and attack traffic. Anagram,
which can be seen as an evolution of PAYL [9] to resist evasion by polymorphic
mimicry attacks, also introduces a new strategy to hinder evasion called ran-
domization. Roughly speaking, each detector uses a secret and random mask
(the key) to partition packets into several (and possibly interleaved) chunks.
These chunks are reordered according to the secret random mask to produce
new inputs to the same normality model; the maximum anomaly score among
them is assigned to the packet. Thus, in randomized Anagram the secrecy of the
mask prevents an attacker from knowing where and how to modify the original
attack so as each chunk will look normal.
In this paper, we analyze the strength of randomized Anagram against key-
recovery attacks and the security consequences of an adversary being able to
recover the secret mask. In particular:
• We discuss adversarial settings where an attacker is given the opportunity
to interact with the detector by providing carefully chosen payloads and
analyzing the binary response (normal/anomalous).
• We provide an efficient algorithm to recover the secret mask using a
bounded amount of queries to Anagram and discuss the experimental re-
sults obtained with a prototype implementation.
• We show that knowledge of such a secret mask, even if it is just approx-
imate, could actually make the randomized version of Anagram weaker
than the non-randomized one against evasion attacks. We present an ex-
ample of how an adversary may use it to carefully distribute the attack
code along the payload to bypass detection.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide
an overview of the necessary background on anomaly detectors and evasion
of NIDS. Section 3 describes the evasion problem present in PAYL and the
design of Anagram, including the randomized variants. Subsequently in Section
4 we introduce an algorithm to recover the key used in randomized Anagram
together with the associated adversarial model. In Section 5 we discuss the
experimental results obtained with a prototype implementation, including an
example of cross-site scripting (XSS) attack appropriately modified to evade
detection. Finally, in Section 6 we summarize our main contributions and draw
conclusions.
2. Background
This section provides an overview of anomaly-based NIDS and reviews the
state of the art in evasion attacks against them.
2.1. Anomaly-based NIDS
Anomaly detectors compare monitored activity with a predefined model of
normality to detect intrusions. These systems compute the model of normality
by a learning process that is usually done off-line, i.e., before deployment, al-
though recent approaches suggest the use of online training to update the model
as new normal activity is observed [14]. The monitored activity can be either
network flows, service requests, packet headers, data payloads, etc. During the
learning process, the system analyzes a set of normal data and computes the
normal model. Afterwards, any activity that does not fit in the normal model is
considered a potential intrusion. Several approaches have been proposed so far
to compute the model from network data [15]. Statistic-based approaches [16]
define the normal model as the probabilities of appearance of certain patterns
in the training data, using thresholds and basic statistical operators such as the
standard deviation, mean, covariance, etc. Heuristic-based approaches automat-
ically generate the model of normal behavior using different approaches such as
machine learning algorithms [4], evolutionary systems [17] or other artificial in-
telligence methods [18]. Payload-based detectors analyze application-layer data
to look for attacks [19, 10]. Anagram, which is the NIDS we consider in this
work, extracts n-grams from payloads to compute the model and detect anoma-
lies. An n-gram is a sequence of n consecutive bytes obtained from a longer
string. The use of n-grams has been widely explored in the intrusion detection
area, although it presents some limitations too [20].
One potential problem of anomaly-based NIDS is the need to periodically re-
train the model as network traffic evolves. Online training solves this problem,
but also opens the door to new threats as we discuss later. Another problem
is that they still present some limitations that make them useless in real world
scenarios [21], including the huge amount of false positives they produce or
the difficulty to faithfully compute a model of normality. As a consequence
of this, few commercial systems actually use anomaly-based approaches. The
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alternative are signature-based detectors, which however are unable to detect
unknown attacks and are vulnerable to polymorphism [22]. In order to properly
detect real-world intrusions, a combination of both techniques is necessary.
2.2. Attacks on NIDS
In recent years, NIDS have become the target of attacks aiming to thwart
detection in various ways. This problem was first considered by Ptacek and
Newsham [23] in a 1998 technical report that focused in subverting the way
in which network traffic is processed by the NIDS, i.e. the reassembly and
fragmentation policy, network flow arrangement and the like. Authors showed
that, regardless of the detection algorithm used by a NIDS, system designers
should take care of the packet processing in order to avoid the NIDS monitoring
data different to what the endpoint being protected would actually receive.
Some solutions have been proposed so far. For example, active mappings [24]
force NIDS to behave identically to the endpoints being protected. Another
solution, given in [25], suggests to normalize network flows so as to provide a
common and precise flow that generates the same data structure in the NIDS
and the endpoint.
Attacks targetting the operation of the detection engine constitute a much
wider area of research, with several works published during the last decade.
For instance, an over-stimulation attack occurs when an attacker knows the
signatures of a NIDS and forces it to generate a huge amount of alarms [26]. In
such situation, the security officer analyzing the alerts would be overwhelmed
and an actual attack may not be detected. Another approach is to change the
appearance of a malicious payload to bypass detection while still exploiting the
system. This can be easily performed for signature-based NIDS. For instance,
Vigna et al. [27] proposed a framework to generate several mutations of a
given exploit. Signatures should take care of any possible mutation, which is
impractical in real scenarios. In the case of anomaly-based NIDS, Fogla et al. [7]
introduced Polymorphic Blending Attacks (PBAs) to target PAYL [8], a former
and simpler version of Anagram. We present and discuss PBAs attacks along
with PAYL and Anagram in Section 3.1.
Online-based NIDS update the detection module (i.e., the signatures or the
model of normality) at detection time. An adversary can inject specially-crafted
noise into one of these systems to force it to, little by little, learn a malicious
behavior. This is called a poisoning attack and it has been proposed both for
signature-based [28, 29] and anomaly-based [30] NIDS.
Machine Learning algorithms are often used to build up the normality model
of anomaly detectors. Research on Machine Learning has traditionally focused
on improving the effectiveness of the solutions, without taking into account
adversarial settings. However, a current area of research has begun to explore
the reliability and security of Machine Learning algorithms under adversarial
models [31, 21, 32, 33].
Some of the cases presented above require the adversary to know the struc-
ture and/or behavior of the NIDS. The purpose of a reverse engineering attack is
precisely to acquire this knowledge. If an adversary is able to get feedback from
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the NIDS to inputs of his choosing (e.g., by observing the responses), he may use
the input-output pairs to infer the detection algorithm [34]. A rather common
solution to make it harder for the adversary to reverse engineer the detection
engine is to use a secret or random key [10, 19]. The security of this approach
has not been formally proved yet, among other reasons because most designs
use these keys to hinder evasion, but do not analyze resistance against reverse
engineering attacks. In this work, we show that the randomization technique
proposed in Anagram [19] is vulnerable to these attacks.
3. Anagram and evasion attacks
Anagram is a NIDS proposed by Wang et al. in 2006 [13]. It improves
PAYL, a former version presented two years before by the same authors [9]. In
2005, Kolesnikov et al. [8] showed a method to evade PAYL using Polymorphic
Blending Attacks [7]. This section analyzes this evasion method and presents
the mechanisms present in Anagram to counteract it.
3.1. Evasion of PAYL
In 2004, Wang et al. presented an anomaly-based NIDS called PAYL (Pay-
load Anomaly Detection) [9]. For each payload length observed in the training
data, PAYL obtains a normality model by storing every n-gram (with n = 1 or
n = 2) from all available attack-free payloads. In detection mode, PAYL first
extracts the n-grams of the packet being analyzed. Each n-gram that is not
present in the normal model increments the anomaly score of the packet. If the
final anomaly score exceeds a predefined threshold, then the packet is tagged as
anomalous.
In [8], Kolesnikov et al. described an efficient method to evade PAYL. This
method was further analyzed and generalized in [7], where the authors formally
presented Polymorphic Blending Attacks (PBAs). This technique consists of
changing the appearance of a worm in order to make it look normal as seen by
the NIDS. A PBA is composed of three parts (see Figure 1):
1. The attack vector, used to exploit some vulnerability and thus penetrate
the target host.
2. The attack body, which represents the core of the attack performing the
malicious actions inside the victim. It is encrypted with some simple
reversible substitution algorithm using a substitution table as a key.
3. The polymorphic decryptor, which includes the substitution table to de-
crypt the attack body and transfers the control to it.
In order to generate a PBA against a NIDS, the attacker first learns the nor-
mality model used by the NIDS, which in the case of PAYL consists of guessing
the distribution of 1-grams (bytes) that normal payloads follow. The attacker
then encrypts the attack body using a simple reversible substitution algorithm,
where each unaccepted byte in the attack body (i.e., one that is not included in
the normal model) is substituted with an accepted byte according to a partic-
ular substitution table. The objective of such a substitution is to masquerade
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Figure 1: Scheme of a Polymorphic Blending Attack (PBA).
the attack body as normal behavior, guaranteeing that it statistically fits the
normal profile. However, as the attack body is sent within the polymorphic de-
cryptor, an optimal substitution table should itself satisfy the normal model as
well. Finding such an optimal substitution table turns out to be an NP-complete
problem. In [35], Fogla and Lee reduced the problem to a Satisfiability or an
ILP (Integer Linear Programming) problem, which can be efficiently solved for
the problem sizes involved. Finally, the polymorphic decryptor is generated. As
the anomaly score of PAYL is the percentage of previously unseen n-grams, the
PBA adds some extra normal bytes as padding to make the score lower. The
attack is spread over different packets, according to the Maximum Transmis-
sion Unit (MTU) of the system, in order to make it easier for the attack to pass
undetected.
3.2. Anagram
In 2006, Wang et al. proposed Anagram [13] to overcome PAYL’s vulnera-
bility to PBA. Anagram uses a more complex model, and also randomizes the
detection process. We next provide a brief overview of its functioning.
3.2.1. Higher order n-grams
Anagram builds a model of normal behavior by considering all the n-grams
(for a given, fixed value of n) that appear in normal traffic payloads. Unlike
PAYL, Anagram uses higher order n-grams (i.e, n > 2), so instead of recording
single bytes or pairs of consecutive bytes, it records strings of size n. This ob-
viously increments the complexity of the normal model and, therefore, requires
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more computational resources. Anagram uses Bloom Filters [36] to reduce the
memory needed to store the model and the time to process packets. Anagram
also uses a model of bad content consisting of n-grams obtained from a set of
Snort signatures and a pool of virus payloads. This procedure is called by the
authors semi-supervised learning. In detection mode, each n-gram that does not
appear in the normal profile increments the anomaly score by 1, except if such
an n-gram is also present in the bad content model, in which case the anomaly
score is incremented by 5. The final anomaly score of a packet is obtained by
dividing the final count by the total number of n-grams processed. Note that
the use of bad-content models makes it possible for the anomaly scores to be
greater than 1. With this semi-supervised procedure, the already known attacks
are taken into account, making Anagram more efficient. More details about the
implementation and how Anagram works can be found in [13].
Evading PAYL requires to learn the normal profile used by the detector.
This can be done stealthily by sniffing traffic destined to the victim’s network
from an external system. To be successful, the PBA needs to add normal n-
grams (with n = 1 or n = 2) in order to decrease the relative frequency of
unseen n-grams in the payload [13]. However, by using higher order n-grams,
Anagram makes it harder to effectively reduce this frequency. The attacker has
to prepare and execute the complex task of spreading the entire attack among
multiple packets so as to reduce the number of unseen n-grams in each packet.
However, this does not completely prevents Anagram from being evaded. In
fact, the problem of finding a PBA against Anagram can be reduced using
the techniques presented by Fogla and Lee in [35]. For this reason, Anagram
does not only focus on higher order n-grams but also introduces the concept of
randomized testing.
3.2.2. Randomized Anagram
A PBA always contains some number q of n-grams that cannot be encrypted,
such as the attack vector or the polymorphic decryptor. Therefore, to achieve
a statistically significant percentage of valid n-grams, the attacker must add an
extra amount p of padding, with p >> q. In [13], a technique called randomized
testing that aims at thwarting PBA against Anagram is described. By using
such a randomization, the attacker will not know exactly how each packet will
be processed and, therefore, where to put the padding to guarantee that evasion
is successful.
Figure 2 graphically shows how randomized testing works, assuming that a
random mask with 3 sets is used. In this case, incoming packets are partitioned
into 3 chunks by applying a randomly generated mask. Such a mask consists of
contiguous strings of 0s, 1s or 2s. Anagram establishes that each string must be
at least 10 bits long in order to keep the n-gram structure of the packets (see [13]
for a detailed description of the random mask generation). The mask is applied
to the payload of a packet to assign each block to one of the three possible
sets. Each resulting set is considered by Anagram as an independent packet
formed by the concatenation of individual blocks, and are tested separately,
thus obtaining different anomaly scores. The higher of these scores is the one
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Figure 2: Computation of the anomaly score in randomized Anagram [13].
given as anomaly score of the original packet. If such an anomaly score exceeds
a predefined threshold T, then the packet is tagged as “anomalous”; otherwise
it is considered “normal.”
The random mask applied in the detection process is kept secret. Conse-
quently, an attacker does not know how the different parts of a packet will be
processed in the detection process and, therefore, does not know where normal
padding should be added in order to achieve an acceptable ratio of unseen n-
grams. Thus, the first goal of an attacker pursuing to evade Anagram should
be to find out the random mask used. Once this is achieved, the techniques
presented in [35] to perform an ordinary PBA could be applied. Moreover, if
the adversary is able to estimate the random mask used in Anagram, this can
be used to easily evade the system it other ways. We describe this in detail
and present an example in Section 5.4. Next section describes our algorithm
to reveal the secret random mask of Anagram along with the adversarial model
that we consider.
4. Reverse engineering attacks on randomized Anagram
In this section, we describe a reverse engineering attack against randomized
Anagram. We first introduce the adversarial model required for this attack to
work, including what capabilites the attacker must possess. We subsequently
discuss the algorithm to recover the random mask. For simplicity, full details
about the attack are provided in Appendix A.
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4.1. Adversarial model
In a reverse engineering attack, the attacker must possess the ability to inter-
act with the system being attacked, often in ways that differ quite significantly
from what may be regarded as normal (e.g., by providing malformed inputs or
an unusually large number of them). In some cases, the ability to do so is close
to the bare minimum required to learn something useful about the system’s
inner workings.
In the field of Secure Machine Learning, in particular when assessing the se-
curity of systems such as Anagram, one major problem comes from the absence
of widely accepted adversarial models giving a precise and motivated description
of the attacker’s capabilities. Barreno et al. [31, 37] have recently introduced
one such adversarial model and discussed various general attack categories. Our
work does not fit well within this model because our main goal is not force the
algorithm to misclassify an instance, but to recover one piece of secret informa-
tion used during operation. Our reverse-engineering scenario is far more similar
to that of Lowd and Meek [38], where the focus is on the role of active experi-
mentation with a classifier. In this case, as emphasized in [38] it is absolutely
essential for the attacker to be able to: (1) send queries to the classifier; and (2)
get some feedback about properties of the query as processed by the system.
In this work, we use the adversarial model introduced in [38] to analyze
the security of Anagram against reverse engineering attacks. In particular,
we assume that the adversary can query Anagram with specific inputs of his
choosing and analyze the corresponding responses, i.e., the adversary can:
1. Prepare a payload p.
2. Query Anagram with p.
3. Obtain the classification of p as normal or anomalous.
Our emphasis in this work is on what can be attained by assuming an at-
tacker with such capabilities. Consequently, we do not make any claims about
the feasibility of the proposed attacks in real-world scenarios. However, in prac-
tical terms we identify two different settings where this adversarial model might
materialize:
• Offline setting. In this case, the attacker is given full access to a trained
but non-operational Anagram for a limited period of time. The attacker
can freely query the system and observe the ouputs at will and without
raising suspicions. For example, this situation may occur during an out-
sourced system auditing, in which the consultant may ask the security
administrator to take full control of the NIDS for a short period of time in
order to carry out some stress testing. Among the battery of tests used,
he might include those queries required by the attack.
• Online setting. Even if the NIDS is operational, it is reasonable to assume
that an attacker can send queries to the NIDS, as the ability to feed the
NIDS with inputs is available to everyone who can access the service being
protected. Thus for example, such queries would be arbitrarily chosen
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payloads sent to an HTTP, FTP, SQL, etc. server. Two difficulties arise
here. First, getting feedback from the NIDS (point 3 above) seems more
problematic. In order for the attacker to determine whether an alarm has
been generated or not, he would need to exploit an already compromised
internal resource, such as for example an employee or device that provides
him with this information. Alternatively, side channels may also be a
source of valuable information (in particular, timing channels [39, 40]),
for example if it takes a different amount of time to classify a normal and
an anomalous request, and this can be remotely determined. The second
difficulty has to do with the fact that during the attack Anagram receives
a large amount of queries, many of which will be tagged as anomalous. As
this might certainly raise some suspicions, the attacker could spread them
over a much larger period of time.
4.2. Mask recovering algorithm
We next describe an algorithm that recovers the secret mask applied by
randomized Anagram. For reasons that will be clearer later, in some cases our
attack could fail to locate exactly the borders between sets. Fortunately, such
errors can only occur in the proximity of the borders and, therefore, the majority
of the recovered mask is correct. Furthermore, the masks thus recovered are still
extremely useful for an adversary to launch an evasion attack, as they point out
which parts of the payload will be grouped together for analysis, even if there
is some uncertainty about a few bytes at the beginning and end of each block.
For readability, in this section we present a high-level description of the
attack. The pseudo-code of all involved procedures along with a detailed expla-
nation can be found in Appendix A.
As described above, Anagram’s masks are formed by concatenating runs
of length at least 10 of natural numbers from the set [0,K]. As shown in
Figure 3, our attack requires two inputs: (1) the maximum estimated size of
the mask; and (2) the maximum estimated number K of sets. The attack would
be successful if both parameters are greater than or equal to the actual ones in
the mask. However, these inputs have a direct influence on the execution time
of the attack, in such a way that a more conservative (or resourceful) adversary
could just use sufficiently high values to guarantee that the recovered mask is
correct. Alternatively, it is possible to launch several attack instances, each one
with a progressively higher value, until the result does not change.
The attack returns a vector with the estimated random mask, each position
indicating the estimated set number. We will use the term delimiter to desig-
nate those mask positions where the mask changes from one set to another; in
particular, if mimi · · ·mimjmj · · ·mj are two consecutive blocks in the mask,
with mi,mj ∈ [0,K] and mi = mj , then the delimiter is the first mj .
The algorithm is iterative. At each iteration, it identifies a new set Scurrent.
The attack stops either when all the mask positions are filled with a set number,
or when the maximum number of sets is reached. Each iteration of the algorithm
is composed of two phases, which are explained in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2,
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Figure 3: Input-Output view of the mask recovering attack.
Figure 4: Phase I of the attack: obtaining an “almosts anomalous” payload.
respectively. Each phase uses as input an initial starting point (Is), which
corresponds to the first position of the delimiter in Scurrent. In the first iteration,
Is is set to 1. In subsequent iterations, Is is the first delimiter found in the
previous iteration such that no set has yet been assigned to it.
4.2.1. Phase I
The main goal of this phase is to construct a payload that is “almost anoma-
lous.” Such a payload is one that is classified as normal by Anagram, but such
that if one single byte is replaced by a “malicious” one μ (which causes changes
in n consecutive n-grams), forces Anagram to classify it as anomalous1. The key
observation here is that such a substitution will cause the payload to become
anomalous if and only if μ is put in a position that belongs to the set with the
maximum anomaly score (Smax for convenience), and that is not close to the
border with the next set so that most affected n-grams fall in Smax.
The payload is built up as represented in Figure 4. The algorithm starts with
a normal payload and Is is set to 1. Then, μ is inserted into the 10 positions
that follow Is (red cells in Figure 4). Next, the algorithm checks whether the
payload becomes anomalous (i.e. whether Scurrent, which is set 1 in Figure 4,
is Smax). If so, the algorithm removes one by one the μ bytes starting at the
end (steps 2 and 3 in Figure 4), until the payload becomes normal again (step
3 in the Figure 4). The resulting payload is such that, while it is classified
as normal, a single addition of μ in any of the positions associated with Smax
would cause it to become anomalous. Note that after Phase I, we guarantee
that Scurrent = Smax.
1In our experiments, we have used as μ a byte with very low probability of occurrence
in normal payloads, such as for example control characters (low ASCII numbers) or letters
belonging to an alphabet different from the one used in the service being protected by the
NIDS (e.g., n˜, accents, etc. if the system serves English web pages).
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Figure 5: Phase II of the attack: μ is moved throughout the payload to detect changes in
Anagram’s ouput. Each change corresponds to a delimiter of the set being processed. In the
figure, the algorithm would detect the delimiters of Set 1, located at positions 13, 23 and 36.
4.2.2. Phase II
By using the payload obtained in Phase I, Phase II exploits the fact that the
addition of a single μ into the sets of Smax would cause the entire payload to
become anomalous, whereas if it is inserted in any other set the payload remains
normal. Phase I obtains payloads such that Scurrent is Smax. Now Phase
II moves one μ over the entire packet, as shown in Figure 5. Whenever such a
moving μ is inserted within the limits of Smax, the payload becomes anomalous;
otherwise it remains normal. This allows us to identify all those positions of
set Scurrent in the mask. In addition, any position where the output changes
from normal to anomalous, or vice versa, is considered a delimiter between set
Scurrent and any other set. Thus, the next starting point Is will be the first
delimiter belonging to a set that has not yet been assigned.
There are some border cases where the procedure described above may fail.
These are next discussed, together with a simple but effective countermeasure
consisting of running Phase II multiple times and carrying out a majority voting
step.
4.2.3. Majority voting
In the description of Phase II above it was assumed that the set obtained
in Phase I, Scurrent, is Smax. Thus, μ is moved throughout the entire payload
to detect where the output changes, therefore detecting the delimiters of the
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current set. However, the algorithm fails if the positions close to the delimiters
contain an already anomalous n-gram. The problem is that the payloads ob-
tained in Phase I are “almost anomalous”, meaning that one single μ within the
limits of Smax usually induces a change in the output. The anomaly score, as
explained in Section 3.2.2, is obtained by dividing the number of unseen n-grams
by the total number of n-grams. Consequently, the output changes when the
number of unseen n-grams increases. However, during Phase II, if μ is inserted
within an already unseen n-gram, then the number of unseen n-grams remains
constant, the output does not change and, therefore, the delimiter is not de-
tected. This situtation, which decreases the effectiveness of the algorithm, can
also be exploited to evade Anagram, as we discuss in Section 5.4.
In order to increase the robustness of our attack, we introduce a majority
voting scheme. Instead of simply recording the results for a single payload
obtained in Phase I, we use several of them. The algorithm records all the
positions indicated by each payload (votes) and, if some position has at least
one half of the votes, then it is considered a delimiter. Even in those cases
where it is unclear where the delimiter is, an analysis of the number of votes
on each position will allow the adversary to estimate zones where the delimiters
are supposed to be, which is enough to evade the system. We show this fact in
Sections 5.2 and 5.4.
5. Experimental setup and results
We have implemented Anagram using the pseudo-code available in [19]. Both
our attack and Anagram’s implementation have been written in Java. Exper-
iments have been run in a dual-core machine with 4GB of RAM. We have
trained and tested Anagram using the same HTTP datasets used by McPAD
[10], another application-layer anomaly detector, which are freely available2. A
summary of the number of payloads and the partition into training, validation
and test sets is given in Table 1. To generate the bad-content model, we use
the web-based signatures of Snort [41], as done originally in Anagram3. Fur-
thermore, to avoid inserting normal n-grams into the bad-content model, we
filter out the data using the validation set from the McPAD dataset and a list
of known words of the HTTP protocol.
We performed the experiments using 3 different n-gram sizes: n = 5, n =
6 and n = 7. Both in the original Anagram paper and in our experiments
these values translate into the best detection quality. The experimental results
presented next are grouped into three sections. In Section 5.1 we assess the
performance of randomized Anagram as suggested in the original paper and
discuss its limitations in terms of detection quality. Subsequently, in Sections
2See http://roberto.perdisci.com/projects/mcpad
3We do not use any virus signatures, as Anagram’s authors do not provide information
about what kind of virus database they used.
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Table 1: Description of the dataset
Training Validation Test Total
Normal payloads 102157 1521 1050 104728
Attack payloads – – 1050 1050
Total 102157 1521 2100 105778
5.2 and 5.3 we report on the accuracy and efficiency (in terms of queries and
CPU time) of the attack, respectively.
5.1. Detection accuracy
In this first experiment, we assess the detection accuracy of randomized Ana-
gram and compare it with the non-randomized version of the detector. Wang et
al. [13] reported results on randomized Anagram using a binary mask (i.e., with
just 2 sets). As our attack is designed to estimate random masks composed of
any number of sets, we also explored the performance of randomized Anagram
using a number of sets greater than 2, with different mask lengths. Specifically,
we have experimented with 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 sets, and mask lengths of 128,
160, 200 and 256 bytes. In this section, we first present a ROC analysis of the
randomized detectors. We next analyze the effect of introducing randomization
on the anomaly score distribution, showing that the anomaly threshold in the
case of randomized detection has to be increased in order to maintain a low
false alarm rate.
5.1.1. ROC analysis
Figure 6 shows the ROC curves of the detectors using n-grams of size 5,
6 and 7. Each plot contains a ROC curve for different number of sets, which
has been obtained by averaging the results of different mask lengths. These
curves are similar to those originally presented by Wang et al. in [13]. It can
be observed that for any value of n, as the number of sets increases, so it does
the false alarm rate. However, all detectors achieve a 100% of detection rate
with a false alarm rate lower than 1%. A false alarm rate greater than 1% has
traditionally being considered unmanageable for a human operator at a large
installation [42]. Accordingly, a typical design goal is to develop NIDS that can
operate at points with a false alarm rate under 1%.
5.1.2. Anomaly Score analysis
Figure 7 shows the distribution of anomaly scores obtained during test using
various n-gram sizes for attack-free packets (FREE, in red) and packets contain-
ing Polymorphic Blending Attack (PBA, in blue). Each plot shows the anomaly
score in the x-axis and the number of payloads having such an anomaly score in
the y-axis. Dotted lines represent the results of the randomized detector using a
mask of 128 bytes with 2 sets, while solid lines show the results using a normal,


















































Figure 6: ROC curves obtained by randomized Anagram for different number of sets and
different n-gram sizes.
As it can be observed, the randomized detector considerably increases the
anomaly scores for both FREE and PBA packets. In our experience, this incre-
ment is even greater for attack-free packets. Although both distributions remain
reasonably distinguishable, the detection threshold in the case of randomized
testing is significantly higher. As we explain in Section 5.4, this property makes
Anagram less robust against an adversary who has discovered the random mask.
5.2. Effectiveness of the attack
Figure 8 shows an example of the execution of the attack using 3 sets and
masks of 160 bytes. The figure is partitioned into three vertical blocks that
should be viewed as concatenated. The actual mask content is shown in the
first row (with the tag M). We run the attack using a maximum number of 8
sets and a maximum random mask length of 300 bytes. Each set is represented
with a different color. The state of the estimated random mask after each
iteration is shown in a different line. Thus, the second row corresponds to the
initial state, where all the positions are set to -1 (in red). In the first iteration of
the attack, the algorithm estimates the positions of the first set (0, in yellow).
In the second iteration, the positions of set 2 are estimated (light green in the
figure), while in the third step the algorithm finds the positions of set 3 (dark
green). After step 3, there is a positive value in every position of the estimated
random mask, so the algorithm stops and returns the estimated mask which, in
this case, perfectly matches the original.
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Figure 7: Distribution of the anomaly scores using 5-, 6- and 7-grams in non-randomized
(plain lines) and randomized (dotted lines) Anagram.
In the case shown in Figure 8, the attack recovers exactly the random mask
used. However, due to the situation explained in Section 4.2.3, in some cases the
algorithm fails to correctly identify some sets. In order to evaluate such errors,
we calculated the distance between the mask estimated by the attack and the
actual one, measured as the number of incorrectly guessed sets divided by the
total number of sets to normalize the results. We repeated each experiment
10 times with randomly generated masks for different Anagram configurations
(i.e., varying the size of the n-grams, the mask size, and the number of sets in
each mask) and computed the average distance between the recovered and the
actual mask.
The number of packets to be used in the voting process depends on the de-
sired accuracy. Figure 9 shows the error obtained when varying the number of
voting packets for three different Anagram configurations. For the configura-
tions used in this paper, it was experimentally determined that no significant
error reduction is achieved with more than 30-40 votes. For example, in the case
of random masks of 128 bytes with 2 sets, only 15 packets would be enough to
reveal the mask perfectly. Accordingly, for a mask of 200 bytes and 4 sets, using
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Figure 8: Evolution of the estimated random mask through consecutive iterations of the
attack. The first line shows the actual mask with 3 different sets. The second line shows
the initial state with all the positions set to -1, while each remaining line corresponds to an
iteration of the algorithm.
20 packets would reveal it as well. Even in the case of a more complex configu-
ration, such as the one with a random mask of 256 bytes and 7 sets, 40 packets
correctly recover 82% of the mask (i.e. an error of 18%). As we discuss later,
this percentage provides enough information to accomplish an evasion attack
against Anagram.
In summary, the expected error depends both on the number of sets and the
size of the randommask. Table 2 shows the experimental results for two different
attack configurations using 10 and 40 votes, respectively. Several conclusions
can be drawn:
• Binary masks are very easy to recover, no matter the size of the n-grams
and, to an extent, the number of voting packets.
• The attack’s probability of error increases with the number of sets and
the mask length. The size of the n-grams seems to have no significant
influence.
• Error decreases as the number of voting packets increases. For example,
while in the case of 10 packets the average error falls between 0.08 and
0.68, it is reduced to less than 0.07 when 40 packets are used.
An interesting property of our mask recovery process is that, even if it does
not estimate the mask exactly, an adversary can figure out approximately where
the delimiters of the mask are by just looking at the votes, as shown in Figure 10.
This plot represents the number of votes obtained for a random mask of length
128 and 3 sets using 7-grams. The x-axis shows the mask positions, while the y-
axis shows the number of votes (i.e., packets indicating that there is a delimiter
in this position). Take for example position 74, which is an actual delimiter. The
number of votes after iterations 2 and 3 are not enough, as the final count does
not reach half of the votes, so the majority voting scheme does not determine
that there is a delimiter there. As a consecuence, the algorithm fails and the
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Table 2: Average distance between estimated and actual masks. Each row corresponds to a





K 128 160 200 256 128 160 200 256 128 160 200 256
2 0.18 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.20 0.13 0.08
3 0.42 0.49 0.54 0.58 0.40 0.48 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.47 0.50 0.51
4 0.39 0.51 0.62 0.70 0.37 0.57 0.60 0.65 0.42 0.56 0.57 0.70 0.56
5 0.50 0.59 0.64 0.71 0.53 0.70 0.63 0.69 0.48 0.60 0.62 0.70 0.62
6 0.53 0.64 0.63 0.75 0.56 0.68 0.64 0.71 0.58 0.65 0.69 0.65 0.64




K 128 160 200 256 128 160 200 256 128 160 200 256
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.04
6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.04 0.42 0.08
7 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.16 0.09 0.12 0.18 0.07
remaining sets may or may not be properly estimated. This limitation can be
detected either by a graphical analysis of the voting results or, alternatively, by
adjusting the number of votes required to achieve majority. This would allow
the adversary to determine which zones of the payload are very likely to contain
no delimiters. Thus, even if the exact mask is not recovered, this information
may suffice to perform an evasion attack, as we later illustrate in Section 5.4.
5.3. Efficiency of the attack
In the previous section we have shown that the proposed attack succeeds
in recovering the random mask or, at least, gives enough information about its
structure. However, when trying to evade any security system, it is critical to
do so spending as few computational resources as possible. Figure 11 shows
the number of queries to Anagram and the CPU time (in seconds) required by
the algorithm for different number of sets. In general, the time required by the
attack directly depends on the number of queries made to Anagram. In turn, the
number of queries strongly depends on Phase I of the attack, where a “nearly-
anomalous” payload is obtained, hence that the data range (size of each box)
is relatively large. For example, using 40 voting packets, the attack requires
between 40 seconds (for binary masks) and 120 seconds (for masks composed of
7 sets), with the average number of queries ranging between 100 and 6000.
5.4. Exploiting randomization to evade detection
Figure 7 shows that the anomaly score using randomized testing is typically
larger than using normal testing, both for attack-free and PBA payloads. This
happens because those payload bytes that are placed in positions around a mask
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Figure 9: Decrease of the average distance between recovered and actual mask as the number
of voting packets increase.
Figure 10: Votes obtained when estimating the mask of 3 sets and 128 bytes length
delimiter are partitioned and concatenated with other chunks of data. In this
process, several unseen n-grams may appear, even with bytes of normal data.
Therefore, in order to achieve a good detection rate while minimizing the false
positive rate, the anomaly threshold must be increased.
If an adversary is able to obtain the random mask being applied, then he can
use the randomized testing process to evade the system. As mentioned above,
when using randomization the threshold should be increased, thus tolerating
the presence of more malicious bytes in the payload. Such malicious bytes are
supposed to be in the positions of the mask delimiters, so an adversary can gen-
erate a packet where the malicious content is placed exactly in these positions,
padding the remaining parts of the payload with normal bytes. Moreover, if the
adversary suspects that parts of the malicious payload appear in the bad-content
model of Anagram, then he can distribute this content around the delimiters
too, in such a way that it will be split and will no longer match this bad-content
model.
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Figure 11: Queries and CPU time required to estimate the random masks with different
number of sets.
Figure 12 exemplifies this idea with a simple instance of an XSS attack using
javascript. The attack actually just launches a pop-up window in the client side.
The first payload only contains the code needed to perform the attack. In the
second payload, padding is added to reduce the percentage of unseen n-grams.
Assume that “image/” is a string that appears in the normal model. In such a
case, padding is inserted as comments of the language (after the characters //
and between /* and */).
The third payload in Figure 12 refers to the same attack, but is especially
crafted to evade detection by using the estimated mask. We assume that the
string “<script>” is in the bad-content model, as it is a frequent word in XSS
attacks. Therefore, when preparing the payload, this word should be placed
around some delimiter in order to have it split. Afterwards, the attacker places
the desired amount of padding bytes in proper places to benefit from the ran-
domization process. Figure 13 shows an example of such a payload prepared for
a random mask of 2 sets. It can be seen that when using randomized testing,
the word “<script>” will be divided into the 5-gram “<scr*/” and tested as
part of the set 1, and the 5-gram “ipt>/”, tested as part of the set 0. Table 3
shows the anomaly scores obtained for each case. For the original payload (first
row), both anomaly scores (for normal and randomized testing) are very large,
which means that the payload is undoubtedly considered as an anomaly. For
the modified payload with normal padding (second row) the anomaly score is
0.45, exceeding the threshold established and therefore being considered anoma-
lous again. However, when using randomized testing and preparing the rogue
payload with padding inserted in the proper positions (third row), the anomaly
score obtained is even lower than the one of the normal test. Moreover, as dis-
cussed in Section 5.1, the anomaly threshold is higher when using randomization
than when using normal testing. In fact, in this case the anomaly threshold is
0.55, so the attack payload will be classified as normal, and thus evasion would
succeed. This example illustrates that the randomized testing is a double-edged
sword, since if the adversary is able to guess the mask, then he can use it against
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Figure 12: Examples of attack payloads used to evade Anagram. Payload 1 is the original
without padding. Payload 2 adds normal padding. Payload 3 is crafted to evade Anagram
once the random mask has been estimated.
Figure 13: Example of how an adversary can set up an attack using the estimated random
mask to evade Anagram.
the detection system.
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Table 3: Anomaly scores obtained with the original payload, the payload with normal padding,
and the payload prepared to evade the system using the estimated random mask.
Normal testing Random testing
1) Original payload 1.50 2.00
2) Payload with padding 0.45 0.53
3) Payload with prepared padding 0.60 0.38
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the strength of randomized Anagram against
mask recovery attacks. Even though the use of randomization certainly makes
evasion harder, we have shown that an adversary who manages to find out such
a mask could actually take advantage of the randomized detection process to
evade Anagram, thus turning a security measure into an undesirable feature. We
have proposed and evaluated a procedure to recover the secret mask by querying
Anagram with carefully constructed payloads and observing the results. Our
attack is quite efficient in terms of the number of queries employed, requiring no
more than 2 minutes to recover the mask in the worst scenario for the range of
the suggested parameters. As discussed above, we do not make any claims about
the feasibility of the proposed attack in real-world scenarios, as this strongly
depends on the adversary having the ability to interact with Anagram in the
ways detailed in Section 4.1.
A possible countermeasure to the proposed attack is to randomize the choos-
ing of random mask itself. Thus, each analyzed packet should be tested against
a different random mask, possibly with different parameters too. While this
would certainly stop our attacks from being effective, we have not assessed the
potential impact of such a double randomization from the detection point of
view.
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Appendix A. Detailed Description of the Attack
The attack to recover the secret mask is divided into several functions. In
order to limit the execution of the algorithm, it takes as inputs two estimated
thresholds: the number of sets and the maximum random mask length (see
Figure 3). We next provide a pseudocode description of the attack divided into
4 algorithms, namely Algorithm 1, 2, 3 and 4.
As shown in Algorithm 1, the attack starts by initializing the mask with the
value ‘-1’. The value ‘-1’ in the position I means that the algorithm has not
yet obtained the set corresponding to I. The algorithm also initializes an empty
list of the positions that are first delimiters. These two structures are global to
all the processes. At each iteration of the algorithm’s main loop, the function
findSet is called with the starting point Is and the current set Scurrent. This
starting point is the position from which the algorithm will search delimiters
of the set starting in this position (Scurrent). In the first step, the algorithm
starts at 0 and obtains the delimiters of the set 0 of the mask. Once obtained,
it will proceed similarly but starting from a new point (line 10 in Algorithm
1), specifically the next delimiter whose set has not been processed yet (i.e., a
delimiter whose next position in the mask is still ‘-1’).
The function findSet, shown in Algorithm 2, receives the starting position
Is and the current set Scurrent. This is the core function of the attack. First,
it selects a payload P which is considered “normal” by calling the function
anagramTest (lines 4-9 in Algorithm 2). Next, it looks for a “nearly-anomalous”
payload P ∗ that is used in the following steps of the algorithm. It does so
by calling the function getValidPayload, which is shown in Algorithm 4 and
explained in Figure 4. The malicious byte μ is inserted into the 10 positions
immediately next to the starting point of payload P (lines 2-5 in Algorithm 4). If
this modification causes the payload to become anomalous (line 7 in Algorithm
4), then it removes the byte μ backwards, one position at a time, until the packet
becomes normal again. This process will only work with payloads P that are
close enough to become anomalous. As we can only use 10 positions following
the starting point Is (by definition these are the only positions that belong to
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the same set with certainty), we need payloads classified as normal that, with
the addition of just a few previously unseen bytes, become anomalous.
Due to the behavior of the randomized test of Anagram, P ∗ (function findSet
showed in Algorithm 2) will become anomalous only when μ is inserted into
chunks of data that are mapped into the set Scurrent. The key point here is that
when μ is inserted in the region of a set different from Scurrent, the anagramTest
will still output “normal”, as this μ is no longer considered within the bytes of
the set S. Therefore, by sliding the malicious byte through the payload (lines
17-28 in Algorithm 2), as shown in the Figure 5, and looking where the output of
anagramTest changes, we can estimate where the delimiters of the set Scurrent
are. Regarding Figure 5, in the steps 1, 2, 3 and 4, anagramTest may output
“anomaly” because the malicious byte is still inserted in the Set 1, whereas steps
5 to 14 may output “normal”. However, in the step 15, as the malicious byte
is inserted again into the Set 1, it may output again “anomaly”. In order to
optimize the process and to avoid unnecessary queries to Anagram, this step is
skipped (line 18 in Algorithm 2) if the position where μ is going to be inserted
has a value different from ‘-1’ in the estimated random mask. We repeat this
process for several payloads and record the delimiters indicated by each of them,
which we call VOTES (line 24 in Algorithm 2). The final step of the algorithm
is to process all votes using the function processVotes (line 31 in Algorithm 2).
The function processVotes, shown in Algorithm 3, processes the votes ob-
tained by all payloads. We consider that a position is a delimiter of Scurrent if it
is supported by at least half of the votes (line 4 in Algorithm 3). If so, we add this
position to the final list of delimiters of Scurrent: D1, D2, ..., Dd. The algorithm
also saves the list of possible next starting points (FIRST DELIMITERS).
Then, the estimated mask is updated by setting the set Scurrent to the positions
between the consecutive delimiters D a and D b (lines 15-17 of 3). Finally, the
function obtains and returns the next starting delimiter whose set has not been
already obtained (lines 22-26 in Algorithm 3). This NEXT Is delimiter will be
the next starting point (Is) for the algorithm (line 5 in Algorithm 1).
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Algorithm 1 FindMask
Input: Number of estimated Sets NS and maximum estimated random length
MAX LENGTH
Output: EstimatedMASK.
1: MASK = {−1, ...,−1}
2: FIRST POSIT IONS = ∅
3: Is ← 0
4: for S = 0 → NS do
5: {NEXT Is} ← findSet (Is, S)
6: if NEXT Is = NULL then
7: return MASK
8: end if
9: Is ← NEXT Is





Input: Initial position Is and current set S
Output: Next starting positions NEXT Is.
1: V ALID = 0
2: V OTES = {0, ..., 0}
3: while V ALID < NUMPAY LOADS do
4: P ← getPayloadFromPool ()
5: OUTPUT ← anagramTest (P )
6: while OUTPUT =′ NORMAL′ do
7: P ← getPayloadFromPool ()
8: OUTPUT ← anagramTest (P )
9: end while
10: P ∗ ← getV alidPayload (P, Is)
11: if P ∗ = NULL then
12: V ALID ← V ALID + 1
13: POSITION ← lastIndexOf (μ, P ∗) + 1
14: LOOKER ← P ∗
15: LOOKER[POSITION ] = μ
16: PREV IOUS ← anagramTest (LOOKER)
17: while POSITION < MASK.LENGTH do
18: if MASK[POSITION ] < 0 then
19: POSITION ← POSITION + 1
20: LOOKER ← P ∗
21: LOOKER[POSITION ] = μ
22: OUTPUT ← anagramTest (LOOKER)
23: if OUTPUT = PREV IOUS then
24: V OTES[POSITION ] ← V OTES[POSITION ] + 1
25: end if
26: end if




31: return processV otes (V OTES, V ALID, S)
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Algorithm 3 processV otes
Input: An array of votes V OTES, the number of valid packets V ALID, the
current set S, the current starting position Is
Output: Next starting delimiter NEXT Is.
1: DELIMITERS ← {Is}
2: END DELIMITER ←′ TRUE′
3: for I = 0 → V OTES.LENGTH do
4: if V OTES[I] >= V ALID/2 then
5: DELIMITERS.add (I)
6: if END DELIMITER then
7: END DELIMITER ←′ FALSE′
8: FIRST DELIMITERS.add (I)
9: else




14: for I = 0 → DELIMITERS.LENGTH − 1 do
15: for J = DELIMITERS[I]→ DELIMITERS[I + 1] do
16: MASK[J ] = S
17: end for
18: I ← I + 2
19: end for
20: sort (FIRST DELIMITERS)
21: NEXT Is ← FIRST DELIMITER[0]
22: while MASK[NEXT Is + 1] > 0ANDNEXT Is = NULL do
23: FIRST DELIMITERS.remove (0)
24: NEXT Is ← FIRST DELIMITER[0]
25: end while
26: return NEXT Is
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Algorithm 4 getV alidPayload
Input: A payload P and the starting position Is.
Output: A payload P ∗ or “NULL′′.
1: P ∗ ← P
2: for i = Is → Is + 10 do
3: P ∗[i] = μ
4: i ← i+ 1
5: end for
6: output ← anagramTest (P )
7: if output =′ ANOMALY ′ then
8: for i = Is + 10 → Is do
9: P ∗[i] = P [i]
10: output ← anagramTest (P ∗)
11: if output =′ NORMAL′ then
12: return P ∗
13: end if
14: i ← i− 1
15: end for
16: end if
17: return NULL
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